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GIBBS V. BABBITT. THE VITALITY OF ENDANGERED
SPECIES PROTECTION IN THE LOPEZ ERA
CHRISTOPHER S. TURNER*

Seventeen times each year officers from the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service cup their hands to their mouths and howl into the North
Carolina wilderness.' If the officers' howls are authentic, red wolves will
emerge from the edges of the forest to delight tourists at the Alligator River2
National Wildlife Refuge, located in eastern North Carolina's Dare County.
The most popular of these howling events is held each year on
"Howloween." The events fill visitors with awe as they listen to the eerie
replies the wolves offer in response, but not everyone is smiling over the
presence of red wolves in eastern North Carolina. The presence of the wolf
has become the source of a bitter struggle between the federal government
and local farmers. Joined by the counties of Hyde and Washington, two
farmers have sued the United States Interior Department and the Fish and
Wildlife Service. The plaintiffs' suit seeks to invalidate federal endangered
species regulations that protect the red wolf from physical harm, even when
the wolf is traversing on private property. The gravamen of the complaint
alleges a violation of the Tenth Amendment,6 which reserves "powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution . . . to the States

respectively, or to the people." 7
The facts leading up to the suit began a dozen years ago when the
Fish and Wildlife Service released a plan to introduce an experimental
population of red wolves into the Alligator River Wildlife Refuge
("Refuge") under the auspices of the Endangered Species Act of 1973. In
the fall of 1987, the Fish and Wildlife Service executed its plan and released
four pairs of captive red wolves into the Refuge. 9 Since then, the population
of red wolves has grown considerably. So much so that the population has
outgrown the confines of the Refuge and has begun to wander off federal
lands.1° Pursuant to statutory provisions and federal regulations, the federal
government continues to regulate the extent to which a private property
owner may "take" a red wolf that is endangering the landowner's property
"Senior Staff Member, Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law. B.A.,
Hanover College, 1998; J.D., University of Kentucky, 2001. The author would like to thank
Katherine Yunker for giving him the idea for this topic.
'Robert S. Greenberger, Wolves Threaten a Legal Pillar,WALL ST. J., Aug. 20,
1999, at BI.2
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Gibbs v. Babbitt, 31 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D.N.C. 1998), aff'd, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir.

2000).
at 532.
'ld.
61d.
7
U.S. CONST. amend. X.

'16 U.S.C. § 1538 (1999).
9
Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
'ld.

J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.

[VOL. 15:2

or person. 11
In 1992, plaintiff Richard Lee Mann became the first person to be
prosecuted for the illegal taking of a red wolf.' 2 This proved to be a
watershed for public opposition to the red wolf program.' 3 In the wake of
Mann's prosecution, Washington County, North Carolina passed a
resolution in opposition to the red wolf program.1 4 In 1994, neighboring
Hyde County followed suit by enacting a resolution calling for the removal
of the red wolf from private lands.15 Later that same year the red wolf
controversy resonated in the halls of the North Carolina Legislature with the
passing of "An Act to Allow
the Trapping and Killing of Red Wolves by
6
Owners of Private Lands."'
The state statute proclaims: [it is] lawful for a private landowner or
the landowner's agent at any time to trap and kill red wolves that are on the
landowner's property, and that the property owner reasonably believes may
be a threat to the person's own life or the lives of others, or to the life of
livestock on the property, [provided that the] landowner has previously
requested the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to remove the red wolves from
the landowner's property and that the landowner shall report the killing of a
wolf to the [Service] within 48 hours. 7
The passage of this Act placed North Carolina law in direct conflict
with federal law. As late as February, 1998, there were approximately

"See 50 C.F.R. § 17.84, which reads in relevant part:
(i) Any person may take red wolves found on private land in the areas defined in paragraphs
(c)(9)(i) and (ii) of this section, provided that such taking is not intentional or willful, or is in
defense of that person's own life or the lives of others; and that such taking is reported within
24 hours to the refuge manager (for the red wolf population defined in paragraph (c)(9)(i) of
this section), the Park superintendent (for the red wolf population defined in paragraph (c)(9)(ii)
of this section), or the State wildlife enforcement officer for investigation ... (iii) Any private
landowner, or any other individual having his or her permission, may take red wolves found on
his or her property in the areas defined in paragraphs (c)(9)(i) and (ii) of this section when the
wolves are in the act of killing livestock or pets, provided that freshly wounded or killed
livestock or pets are evident and that all such taking shall be reported within 24 hours to the
refuge manager ...

the Park superintendent ...

or the State wildlife enforcement officer for

investigation. (iv) Any private landowner, or any other individual having his or her permission,
may harass red wolves found on his or her property in the areas defined in paragraphs (c)(9)(i)
and (ii) of this section, provided that all such harassment is by methods that are not lethal or
physically injurious to the red wolf and is reported within 24 hours to the refuge manager ....
the Park superintendent, . . . or the State wildlife enforcement officer as noted in (c)(6) of this
section for investigation. (v) Any private landowner may take red wolves found on his or her
property in the areas defined in paragraphs (c)(9)(i) and (ii) of this section after efforts by
project personnel to capture such animals have been abandoned, provided that the Service
project leader or biologist has approved such actions in writing and all such taking shall be
reported within 24 hours to the Service project leader or biologist, the refuge manager, . . . the
Park superintendent,... or the State wildlife enforcement officer for investigation. 50 C.F.R. §
17.84(c)(4) (2000).
12Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 533.
l3Id.
141d.
151d.
161994 N.C. Sess. Laws 635.

17Id.
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8
seventy-five red wolves running free in the North Carolina wilderness.1
Thus, the issue ultimately facing the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was whether the federal government
19
possessed the power, enumerated within the Commerce Clause, to
o
for
cross
motions
filed
sides
promulgate 50 C.F.R. § 17.84.2 At trial, both
21
federal
the
defendant
granted
court
district
The
judgment.
summary
government's motion and denied plaintiffs' motion. 22 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit upheld the district court's ruling, holding § 17.84 a permissible
expression under Congress' commerce power. 23 Practically speaking, this
Lopez, 24
resolved whether the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
and the Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Morrison,2 limited
the federal government's ability to regulate the takings of endangered
species on private land.

I. HISTORY OF ADJUDICATION UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A. The Extent of Congress' Power Prior to 1937
Even today when courts consider cases that implicate the
Commerce Clause, they often begin their discussion with the landmark case
of Gibbons v. Ogden.26 Though Gibbons is often considered a dormant
Commerce Clause case, 27 it is inmany ways the Court's first discussion of
Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause. The case arose when
Gibbons contested a New York law granting Robert Fulton and Robert
2
Livingston a monopoly for operating steamboats in New York waters.
Gibbons argued that he had the right to operate his ferry in New York waters
because it was licensed under a federal law as "[a] vessel[] in the coasting
trade." 29 The Supreme Court, with Chief Justice John Marshall writing for
the majority, held that Gibbons was permitted to operate his ferry because
30
The
the New York granted monopoly was preempted by federal law.
an
impermissible
was
law
York
New
Court went on to hold that the
"8Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
'9U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3. The clause reads: "[Congress shall have the power]
to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."
20Gibbs, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 534.
2
Id. at 532.
221d. at 536.
2Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 487.
24514 U.S. 549 (1995). The government's ability to promulgate 50 C.F.R. § 17.84
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
would have been a forgone conclusion prior to Lopez.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPALS AND POLICIES 185-94 (1997) (analyzing the Court's
decisions respecting the federal government's powers under the Commerce Clause prior to
Lopez).
25United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
2622 U.S. (9 Wheat.) I(1824).
27Also referred to as the negative implications of the Commerce Clause.
28
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 188.
9CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20,at 175-76 (citing Gibbons,22 U.S. at 189).
3
ld. (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193).
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restriction of interstate commerce. 3' The first holding that the federal law
preempted the New York monopoly, however, explicitly recognized
Congress' ability to regulate commerce and remains the Court's first
interpretation of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause.
Gibbons contains two other significant holdings. First, it defined
"commerce" as something more than traffic.32 The Court opined that
commerce is "intercourse." 33 Marshall further described commerce as "the
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its
branches." 34 That is, Gibbons granted "commerce" a definition that
included all phases of business.35 Second, the Gibbons Court gave meaning
to the phrase "among the several states. 36 The Court wrote that "the word
'among' means intermingled with. A thing which is among others, is
intermingled with them. Commerce among the States, cannot stop at the
external boundary line of each State, but may be introduced into the
interior." 37 This definition allowed Congress to regulate phenomena having
an impact on interstate commerce even if the event occurred only within the
boundaries of one state, but left solely intrastate activities that bore no
relation to commerce outside the state to the states' dominion. 38 The Court
thus defined39 commerce broadly, but took a middle road in defining "among
the states.",
Finally, the Gibbons Court flatly rejected the idea of any Tenth
Amendment limitations on Congressional power. 4° Marshall wrote, "This
power, like all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be
executed to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than
are prescribed in the constitution."'41 Beginning in the latter part of the
nineteenth century, however, the United States Supreme Court would
distance itself from the strong language of Gibbons. A conservative Court
packed with classical economists invalidated many federal laws as violative
of the Tenth Amendment. 42 The Tenth Amendment became a significant
obstacle to Congress' exercise of its commerce power.43
From 1887 through 1937, the Supreme Court began to utilize its
44
powers of judicial review to place real limits on congressional authority.
The beliefs espoused by the Court during this era gave birth to the doctrine
31

id.

32

1d.

33

1d.

34CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 175 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 190).
3

31d.

36U.5. Const. art. I, § 8,
37
3

c1. 3.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194.

1See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 176.

39

See id. Chemerinsky opines that the Court could have ruled that "among" meant
"in the midst of." Id. Such a holding would have meant that Congress could control all
commerce, even strictly intrastate commerce. Id.
4Id.
at 177.
41
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196.
42
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 178.
43
1d.

4Id. at 178-79.
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of dual federalism. That is, the justices recognized federal and state
governments as independent sovereigns possessing their own clear zones of
authority.45 If a federal law breached the zone of authority the Court
believed was reserved to the state, such a law would be invalidated as an
impermissible overreach of congressional power. 46 Commerce was viewed
as separate and distinct from other stages of business.47 Functions like
mining, manufacturing, or production were viewed as zones of state
regulation protected from federal intrusion by the Tenth Amendment.4
During this era, the Court also gave a new, more stringent meaning
to "commerce" and "among the states." As alluded to above, the Court gave
commerce a narrow definition and viewed it as distinct from other stages of
Often the
business like manufacturing, mining, and production.
distinctions the Court drew between state controlled stages of business and
commerce seemed illusory. 50 For example, in United States v. E. C.
Knight,5' the Court invalidated the Sherman Antitrust Act 5 2 when the Justice
Department attempted to prevent a monopoly by the E.C. Knight Company
in the sugar refining industry. 53 Even though E.C. Knight owned ninetyeight percent of the industry, the Court held that E.C. Knight's monopoly
was in the production of sugar, not in the commerce of sugar. 54 Thus, the
Court would only enforce the Sherman Antitrust Act to the extent it blocked
monopolies in the realm of commerce.
The pre-1937 Supreme Court also severely limited the meaning of
"among the states."55 The Court began to require that the phenomena
Congress sought to regulate bear a direct relationship to interstate
commerce.56 Often, however, this distinction was not easy for the Court to
draw. The most common approach employed by the justices to determine
direct from indirect effects was the stream of commerce analysis.57 That is,
congressional regulations were permissible if they regulated the actual
stream of commerce. In addition to the obvious channels of commerce, such
as railroads and navigable bodies of water, stockyards were also defined as a
45

1d.
4See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the wage
and hour provisions of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal provision that outlawed the shipment of goods into
interstate commerce that were made by child labor); United States v. E.C: Knight Co., 156 U.S.
S(1895) (invalidating federal antitrust regulations).
47
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 179.
48id.

491d. at 180.
'Old.
"I1 5 6 U.S. 1 (1895).
5215 U.S.C. § (1999).
53

See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S.1.
Rld. at 12.
55

CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 179.

'See. e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935) ("Where the effect of intrastate transactions upon interstate commerce is merely indirect,
such transactions
remain within the domain of state power.").
57
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 182.
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part of the stream of commerce. 58 The Court's generosity did not extend far,
however. The Court still required that the regulation actually relate directly
to the protection of the stream of commerce, not merely that it relate
tangentially to the stream. illustrative of this principle is Railroad
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.59 Even though the regulation at
issue, the Railroad Retirement Act of 1934,60.directly related to a specific
channel in the stream of commerce, the railways, the Court invalidated the
Act on the basis that it did not directly affect the safety or efficiency of the
railroads. 61 The Court ruled that regulation of a pension program for rail
employees only helped "the social welfare of62the worker, and therefore
[was] remote from any regulation of commerce."
During the pre-1937 era, state sovereignty represented a formidable
barrier for congressional regulation. At least in the field of economic
regulation, the barrier seemed nearly impenetrable. 63 But the political
pressures of economic depression combined with anxiousness to pass New
Deal legislation loomed large over the Court. The Court's refusal to validate
many of Congress' attempted economic reforms caused tremendous political
turmoil for the United States Supreme Court and soon it buckled under the
pressure. The swift reversal in the Court's interpretation of Congress'
commerce power will continue to be perennial fodder for political theorists,
but it is outside the scope of this comment. More important for purposes of
this discussion is the Court's change in philosophy and the effect that
change had on congressional power after 1937.
B. The Meaning of the Commerce Clause from 1937-1995
Three key decisions greatly changed Congress' ability to regulate
under the Commerce Clause and effectively overruled the Supreme Court's
decisions, not one law was
Following these
previous decisions."
authority until 1995.65 The
of
Congress'
the
scope
invalidated as exceeding
Court no longer distinguished between commerce and the other stages of
66
business, giving Congress broad powers to regulate all phases of business.
Likewise, the Court obliterated the illusory distinction between direct and

5
See Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (upholding the Sherman
Act as it related to price fixing among meat dealers at stockyards, noting that although the
stockyards themselves were intrastate, they were also checkpoints at which cattle stopped
during the course of their interstate transport).
59295 U.S. 330 (1935).
6045 U.S.C. § 209 (1934) (repealed 1966).
61
See Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. at 368.
6Id.
63The Court did allow some room for congressional regulation when the regulation
had a moral purpose. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (upholding federal law
prohibiting the interstate shipment of lottery tickets).
"See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100
(1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
6CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20, at 187.
6Id. at 190.
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indirect effects on interstate commerce. 67 "Among the states"came to mean
that Congress could regulate any activity that taken cumulatively had an
effect on interstate commerce." This so broadened Congress' authority that
it seemed the Commerce Clause was a gateway to virtually any regulation
Congress could imagine, a kind of Pandora's box that gave teeth to every
utterance issued by Congress. Representative of the Court's philosophy
during this era was Hodel v. Indiana,69 in which the Court held that "[a]
court may invalidate legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if
it is clear that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce."70
Due to the Court's relaxation of the dual federalism doctrine, an
explosion of Congressional legislation occurred in three primary areas:
Of special
regulatory laws; civil rights laws; and criminal laws.7'
importance to this comment is the rise of administrative agencies and their
regulatory laws. In fact, many commentators believe that without the
Court's expansion of Congress' authority under the Commerce Clause,
regulatory agencies would never have enjoyed the kind of preeminence they
now possess.72 Because Congress now only needs to prove that a rational
basis exists for its belief that a certain activity will affect interstate
commerce, it has been able to regulate all sorts of intrastate activities- 73
especially when those regulations affect the welfare of the environment.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.74 had ushered in a new era. Federalism no
longer precluded Congress from achieving its legislative aims. But as
federalism reemerged on the Court's agenda, an erosion of Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause once again seemed possible.75
67

1d"

69452 U.S. 314 (1981).
70
711d. at 323-24.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 20,at 191.
R1d
7See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 277
(1981) (recognizing Congress' finding that "many surface mining operations result in
disturbances of surface areas that burden and adversely affect commerce and the public welfare
by destroying or diminishing the utility of land .. .by causing erosion and landslides, by
contributing to floods, by polluting the water, by destroying fish and wildlife habitat, by
impairing natural beauty, by damaging the property of citizens, by creating hazards dangerous
to life and property.... and by counteracting government programs and efforts to conserve soil,
water, and other natural resources."); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981) (upholding a
portion of the same act that was at issue in Virginia Surface Mining).
74301 U.S. 1 (1937).
75
452 U.S. 264
As early as Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass "n,
(1981), and Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981), dissension on the Court could be detected
by the astute observer. In a concurrence applying to both cases, Justice Rehnquist wrote: "[Ilt
would be a mistake to conclude that Congress' power to regulate . . . is unlimited. Some
activities may be so private or local in nature that they may not be in commerce .... Mhe
Court asserts that regulation will be upheld if Congress had a rational basis for finding that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce ... [But] it has long been established that...
[t]here must instead be a showing that the regulated activity has a substantial effect on that
commerce."
Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. at 310-12 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Depending on your outlook, Rehnquist's concurrence can be viewed as his assent to the Court's
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76
C. The Resurgence of Federalism after United States v. Lopez

At issue in Lopez was the validity of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, which made it illegal for one to possess a firearm within one
thousand feet of a school. 77 The Court concluded that the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was unconstitutional because it failed to bear a substantial
relation to interstate commerce. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist
declared that "[w]e start with first principles. The Constitution creates a
Federal Government of enumerated powers."78 And with that, the Court
reclaimed its role in the realm of Commerce Clause adjudication. The Court
went on to identify three types of activities still within the domain of
congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause. 79 First, Congress
may "regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.' ' 0 The Court
cited Heart of Atlanta Motel v, United States8' for this proposition.
"Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate
commerce, even though the threat may come only from intrastate
activities." 82

The Court cited a laundry list of cases in support of this

proposition, for this area has been one of the historical bastions of
Congress's commerce power. 83 "Finally, Congress' commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
interstate commerce." 4
The decision in Lopez rests on two principles. First, federal statutes
must have more than an attenuated connection to commerce. 85 That is, the
statute must have a commercial aspect or be of a commercial nature.
Second, the federal statute in question must not intrude on areas of
traditional state concern.8 6 This is perhaps what Chief Justice Rehnquist
meant by "first principles. 87 Our federal system of government has always
allowed states to self regulate certain areas of social concern. In the Lopez
era, any statute that encroaches on one of these traditional areas will be
subject to heavy constitutional scrutiny.
The query now becomes whether Lopez is a trumpet sounding the
rational basis theory, or instead as a hint that the substantial basis test should not be so readily
abandoned. It is worth noting that Rehnquist's opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995), declared that there must be a "substantial effect" on interstate commerce in order for a
law to be valid. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563, 565.
76514 U.S. 549 (1995).
U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(a) (1999).
77718
t
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
7id. at 558.
&Old.
8379 U.S. 241 (1964).
82Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
"See, e.g., Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
"Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S.
1,37 (1937)).
85See id. at 567. Lopez makes special note of those statutes where it is necessary to
"pile inference upon inference" in order to find a commercial connection. Id.
concurring).
86d. at 580 (Kennedy, J.,
' 7See id. at 552.

2000-2001]

ENDANGERED SPECIES PROTECTION

reinvigoration of federalist notions that the government is one of limited
powers or whether it is a mere blip on the radar screen of Commerce Clause
adjudication, a mere aberration to be disregarded. According to at least one
erudite scholar, Lopez is a signal that:
[we can indeed] go back to the days of limited national
power . . . so long as: 1) we can figure out a workable
theory of the limits on federal commerce power; 2) we can
agree on the propriety of vigorous judicial review in
federalism cases; and 3) we can take proper account of the
important reliance interests that have accrued around
88
certain key precedents decided in the past half century.
Of course the above factors are tall orders to fill. Only one United
States Supreme Court case has extended Lopez,8 9 and the statute at issue
there 9° shared many qualities with the Gun Free School Zones Act. Thus, it
the floodgates
is not likely and has not borne out so far that Lopez will open
9
to all litigants seeking to limit Congress' commerce power. '
Because Lopez is a fairly recent opinion, little case law has
emerged with regard to it. However, at least one endangered species takings
regulation has withstood the potential obstacles put forth by the Lopez
Court. In NationalAss 'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt,92 the issue was the
constitutionality of a takings provision of the Endangered Species Act as
applied to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly, whose habitat is exclusively
in southern California. 93 Plaintiff Home Builders wished to enjoin the
enforcement of subsection (9)(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act94 on
grounds that it exceeded Congress' commerce power. 95 The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the regulation was within the
realm of Congress' commerce power under the first and third categories of
Lopez.9 The court noted that under the first category defined in Lopez "the
prohibition on takings of endangered species is necessary to enable the
government to control the transport of endangered species in interttate
commerce. Second, the prohibition on takings of endangered animals falls
under Congress' authority 'to keep the channels of interstate commerce free
"Stephen G. Calabresi, ",4Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995).
Defense of United
89See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
9Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
91
As can be imagined, several hopeful litigants have attempted to invoke Tenth
Amendment protections in the wake of Lopez. The lower federal courts have not yet gone
down the path blazed by Lopez, and the Supreme Court has thus far denied certiorari in those
cases. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997),
cert. den'd, 524 U.S. 937 (1998).
92130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
93
1d. at 1043.
9416 U.S.C. § 1532 (1999).
9
National Ass' ofHome Builders, 130 F.3d at 1041.
9Id. at 1046.
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from immoral and injurious uses."' 97 The court further noted that the takings
statute bore a substantial relation to interstate commerce in that interstate
commerce would be affected if takings were permitted. 98 Thus, the stage
was set for Gibbs v. Babbitt.

II. THE COURT'S DECISION IN GIBBS
The Fourth Circuit addressed whether Congress had thejower,
In a
under the Commerce Clause, to promulgate 50 C.F.R. § 17.84(c).
two-to-one decision, the Fourth Circuit upheld the regulation because "the
regulated activity substantially affects interstate commerce and because the
regulation is part of a comprehensive federal program for the protection of
endangered species."'10
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the earlier decision of the District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. However, the court of
appeals' decision upheld the regulation on slightly different grounds.
Whereas the district court found that the red wolves operated in interstate
commerce because they moved across state lines,' 0 ' the Fourth Circuit held
that "[a]lthough the [Fish & Wildlife] Service has transported the red wolves
interstate for the purposes of study and the reintroduction programs, this is
not sufficient to make the red wolf a 'thing' in interstate commerce."' 0 2
Instead, the court based its affirmation on grounds that the preservation of
environmental resources substantially relates to interstate commerce.10 3
In analyzing the commercial nature of environmental regulation the
Gibbs court noted that, although finding an economic connection was an
important part of both the Lopez and Morrison tests, "economic activity
must be understood in broad terms."' t 4 Given the broad terms of the court's
definition of economic activity, it upheld § 17.84(c) because the "protection
of commercial and economic assets is a primary reason for [the] taking of
[red] wolves."' 0 5 Further, the court held that the "relationship between red
wolf takings and interstate commerce is quite direct-with no red wolves,
there will be no red wolf related tourism, no scientific research, and no
commercial trade in pelts."' 6 Finally, while the majority admitted that the
taking of a single red wolf is insubstantial, it noted that the takings of red
wolves in the aggregate would present a substantial impact on interstate
97

(1964)).

98

d. (quoting Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256

See id. at 1049. The court admitted that endangered species were not themselves
commerce, but that their continued existence would have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
99Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 486.
'I°ld. at 487.
' 01Gibbs 31 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
'1°Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 491.
"'31d. at 493.
'O'ld. at 491.
at 492.
'°ld.
6
10
1d.
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commerce.
In terms of its implications to the field of environmental regulation,
however, the second ruling in Gibbs is more significant. Citing Hodel v.
8
Indiana,10
the court held:
A complex regulatory program . . . can survive a
Commerce Clause challenge without a showing that every
single facet of the program is independently and directly
related to a valid congressional goal. It is enough that the
challenged provisions are an integral part of the regulatory
program and that the regulatory
scheme when considered
t °9
as a whole satisfies this test.
Section 17.84(c) is only a tiny portion of a broad federal scheme to
preserve biodiversity.110 Therefore, according to the Fourth Circuit, even if
§ 17.84(c) did not possess an independent relation to a valid congressional
goal, it is still an integral piece of a legitimate overall regulatory scheme."'
That is, because the Endangered Species Act as a whole passes the
constitutional test," 2 so too does § 17.84(c). Hence, § 17.84(c) is
permissible on two grounds. Not only does the regulation substantially
relate to interstate commerce in and of itself, but it is also a fragment of an
overall legitimate federal regulatory scheme.
In concluding its examination, the Gibbs court distinguished §
17.84(c) from both the Gun Free School Zones Act invalidated in Lopez and
the private action enabling section of the Violence Against Women Act
invalidated in Morrison. The court stated that "the Constitution requires a
distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local ... [and
t]he regulated activity at issue here does not involve an area of traditional
state concern,
one to which States lay claim by right of history and
13
expertise."'

III. CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court's extension of the Lopez
principles in United States v. Morrison sheds considerable light on modem
Commerce Clause adjudication, a test referred to by Chief Judge Wilkinson
of the Fourth Circuit as a "rational basis review with teeth." 1 4 Together,
'07Gibbs, 214 F.3d. at 493.
'08452 U.S. 314 (1981).

uaGibbs, 214 F.3d at 497.
..Id.at498.
"2See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687
(1995); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); National Ass'n of Home Builders
v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
"'Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, _ 120
S.Ct. 1740, 1754-55
(2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580, 583 (1995)).
4

11Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 490.
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Lopez and Morrison define a model for impermissible congressional
legislation. That is, there are two overriding characteristics shared by the
invalidated provisions at issue in these cases. First, the I uestionable statute
And second, it
or regulation must be logically uncommercial in nature.
6
must encroach on a traditional matter of state concern."
The Fourth Circuit's pronouncement in Gibbs all but closes the
door to future constitutional challenges because it adequately demonstrates
how neither of the Lopez and Morrison characteristics are satisfied within
the realm of endangered species regulation. Further, the Fourth Circuit is7
widely considered to be the most conservative circuit court in the country.'
In fact, it invalidated the legislation at issue in Morrison." 8 Ostensibly, if
even the Fourth Circuit shies away from invalidating endangered species
legislation, an invalidation coming from another circuit is unlikely. Finally,
the Gibbs ruling is significant in that it recognizes the nearly century old
erosion of states' rights to wildlife regulation.' 9 Environmental protection
has long been primarily a matter of federal concern 20 and several courts,
prior to the Gibbs court, have recognized the inherently federal character of
environmental protection.
Ultimately, Gibbs stands for the principle that
upholding endangered species regulation is consistent with the "first
principles" of a Constitution that establishes a federal government of
enumerated powers.

- 120 S.Ct. at 1754-55; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
at ____ 120 S.Ct. at 1754-55; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 580.
The
Politics
of
Judicial
Selection,
at
http://www.intellectualcapital.com/issues/issue306/item6648.asp (Sept. 30. 1-9991
11
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic .Inst. & State Univ., 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir.
1999).
"209See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 499-501.
1 1d.
2
S 'See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (holding that states do not
own the wildlife within their borders and that state laws regulating wildlife are circumscribed
by Congress' commerce power).
"'See Morrison,

529 U.S. at

16
"7 See Morrison, 529
1 Randall
Kennedy,

U.S.

